THE HEARTLAND INSTITUTE

POLICY REPORT

Will the Last Taxpayer in Illinois Please Turn Out the Lights:

An Economic Assessment of the Illinois 'Fair Tax'

By Arthur Laffer, Ph.D., Stephen Moore, and Erwin Antoni, Ph.D.

Executive Summary

This study examines the proposed state constitutional amendment that would change the Illinois state income tax from a flat tax to a graduated income tax. Passage of the constitutional amendment would allow the enactment of Illinois Senate Bill 687, which would raise personal and corporate income tax rates. The highest personal income tax rate would rise by more than 60 percent, from 4.95 percent to 7.99 percent. This would be one of the largest tax increases on small and large businesses imposed in any state in at least the past two decades.

In this study, we examine how similar tax changes enacted in other states over the past 60 years have affected economic performance. We also examine Illinois' current economic performance and analyze the effect these proposed tax changes would have on the state's future performance. Finally, we provide econometric projections to quantify the economic impact of the proposed constitutional amendment. We provide a range of estimates of job losses, outmigration, lost production and state income, and slower home value appreciation.

We find that the Illinois "Allow for Graduated Income Tax Amendment" would have significant negative effects on the state's economy and its citizens.

Passage of Illinois Senate Joint Resolution Constitutional Amendment 1, in conjunction with Senate Bill 687, would introduce the following tax changes:

- Increase the top personal income tax rate from 4.95 percent to 7.99 percent
- Set the top tax bracket at $750,000 for individuals and $1 million for joint filers
- Apply the top rate of 7.99 percent to *all* income (not just income above $750,000/$1,000,000) for those in the top bracket
- Subject filers with taxable income below $750,000/$1,000,000 to a graduated tax schedule with a top rate of 7.85 percent[1]

[1] Because of the switch to a flat tax above $750,000, there is a cliff effect: Filers making $750,000 would pay $51,460 in state tax, whereas filers making $750,001 would pay $60,005—a difference of $8,545.

- Increase the top net corporate income tax rate from 9.5 percent to 10.49 percent
- Establish a tax amnesty program for evaders of the franchise tax and license fees
- Phase out and repeal the Illinois franchise tax by January 1, 2024

If Constitutional Amendment 1 passes:

- Job growth would slow by an estimated 566,000 over the next 10 years, effectively eliminating about one in 10 current jobs
- Net migration to Illinois (people from other states moving to Illinois minus the number of people moving out of Illinois) would be negative: 1.4 million fewer residents over the next decade, due to the tax. The outmigration from Illinois would be about nine times faster than its current rate
- Personal income growth would be $19.2 billion less over the next 10 years
- Illinois' gross state product (GSP) would grow by $20.5 billion less over the next decade
- Illinois' tax revenues would increase, but by far less than the projected $3.6 billion in new revenues. In the decade after enactment of the progressive tax, additional revenues would be just 39 percent of the projected $3.6 billion, roughly $1.4 billion
- Illinois' economic competition position among the 50 states would fall from 47th to 49th in the widely acclaimed ALEC-Laffer Competitiveness Index. Illinois would move from having the 18th lowest personal income tax rate in the nation to the ninth highest
- Home value appreciation would be 10.4 percent less over a decade, because there would be fewer people buying homes in the state
- Successful Illinois small businesses would be adversely impacted, and severely so, by the tax because most small business owners pay taxes through personal income taxes, not the corporate tax. Federal studies show that more than half the taxes on those filers with incomes above $500,000 are paid by small business owners and investors. A Small Business Administration study found more than half of all jobs come from small businesses
- The corporate tax increase would make Illinois one of the five highest-taxed jurisdictions in the entire world. Only New Jersey and a handful of third-world nations would have a higher tax on corporations. Corporate headquarters would move out of Illinois as a result

Figures 1, 2, and 3 (see pages 3 and 4) illustrate the further erosion of Illinois' competitiveness if the Pritzker tax were to become law. Illinois' sales and property taxes are already among the highest in the nation. Only New Jersey would have a higher corporate tax rate. Only five states would have higher tax rates on pass-through income, and only eight states would have higher rates on nonbusiness income.

"Figures 1, 2, and 3 (see pages 3 and 4) illustrate the further erosion of Illinois' competitiveness if the Pritzker tax were to become law."

This is the *worst* possible time to be raising income tax rates on small businesses, primarily for two reasons. First, although Gov. J.B. Pritzker says the tax would negatively affect only millionaires and billionaires, the tax would hit small businesses with profits as low as $250,000. Small firms such as stores, shops, and restaurants have already been negatively impacted by the COVID-19 shutdowns in Illinois. Raising taxes just as they are beginning to once again operate at or

near full capacity would inhibit the state's desperately needed recovery.

Second, the federal tax law changes enacted in 2017 capped the deduction of state and local taxes (SALT) from federal tax liabilities at $10,000 per year. As a result, most wealthy Americans, especially in high-tax states, will no longer be able to write off some 40 percent of their state and local taxes from their federal taxes. All the burden from the higher tax rates would now fall on the shoulders of state taxpayers, making state taxes much more burdensome on residents of high-tax states such as California, New Jersey, New York, and Illinois.

Figure 1
Top Marginal Corporate Tax Rates by State, 2021



Figure 2
Small Business Tax Rate, 2021



Figure 3
Top Marginal Income Tax Rate by State, 2021



Pritzker's Proposed Tax Changes

On November 3, 2020, Illinois voters will vote on a proposed amendment to the 1970 Illinois Constitution. Illinois Senate Joint Resolution Constitutional Amendment 1, also known as the "Allow for Graduated Income Tax Amendment," would allow the Illinois state income tax code to transition from a flat tax to a graduated income tax. To pass, the amendment must receive "yes" votes from 60 percent of the votes made on the amendment itself, or "yes" votes on a simple majority of all ballots submitted for the general election.

In 2019, the Illinois legislature introduced and approved a resolution that would place the Allow for Graduated Income Tax Amendment up for a vote during the November 2020 election. The Illinois legislature subsequently passed Senate Bill 687, referred to as the "Illinois Fair Tax," which would alter the structure of Illinois' income tax brackets should voters approve the amendment.

Constitutional Amendment 1 would amend Section 3(a) of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution. The following strikethrough text would be removed from the Constitution, and the underlined text would be added to the Constitution:

> "*The General Assembly shall provide by law for the rate or rates of any tax on or measured by income imposed by the State.* ~~*A tax on or measured by income shall be at a non-graduated rate. At any one time there may be no more than one such tax imposed by the State for State purposes on individuals and one such tax so imposed on corporations.*~~ *In any such tax imposed upon corporations the highest rate shall not exceed the highest rate imposed on individuals by more than a ratio of 8 to 5.*"

Senate Bill 687 would eliminate Illinois' current 4.95 percent flat-rate personal income tax on all incomes and institute graduated income tax rates for individual and joint filers as follows:

Table 1
Illinois' Proposed Personal Income Tax Rates
(effective January 1, 2021, pending the passage of Constitutional Amendment 1)

Individual Filers

Marginal Tax Rate	Net Income
4.75%	$0-$10,000
4.90%	$10,001-$100,000
4.95%	$100,001-$250,000
7.75%	$250,001-$350,000
7.85%	$350,001-$750,000
7.99% (applied to total income)	>$750,000

Joint Filers

Marginal Tax Rate	Net Income
4.75%	$0-$10,000
4.90%	$10,001-$100,000
4.95%	$100,001-$250,000
7.75%	$250,001-$500,000
7.85%	$500,001-$1,000,000
7.99% (applied to total income)	>$1,000,000

Corporate income taxes would also increase under Senate Bill 687. Illinois' corporate income tax rate is currently a flat rate of 7 percent. The state constitution prohibits this rate from exceeding the personal income tax rate by a ratio of eight to five, so under the current 4.95 percent personal income tax rate, the corporate income tax rate is capped at 7.92 percent. Illinois also collects a 2.5 percent Personal Property Replacement Tax (PPRT), created in 1976 to fund local governments. This surcharge brings the total corporate income tax rate to 9.5 percent. The PPRT is levied in addition to the corporate income tax and is not subject to the tax rate ceiling calculated using the eight-to-five ratio.

Senate Bill 687 would raise the corporate income tax rate from 7 percent to 7.99 percent, and from 9.5 percent to 10.49 percent with the PPRT. On its own, this rate hike would impose harsh negative externalities for Illinois. However, even more concerning is the language of Senate Joint Resolution 1, the question on the ballot this fall. As noted, the Illinois Constitution prevents the corporate income tax rate from exceeding the personal income tax rate by more than an eight-to-five ratio, but if the state were to adopt a graduated income tax, the constitution must specify the rate used to calculate a ceiling on corporate income tax rates. SJR 1 tethers the maximum corporate income tax rate to the highest personal income tax rate. At a ratio of eight to five, this would place the ceiling of the corporate income tax rate at 12.78 percent, or a whopping 15.28 percent with the PPRT. Upon passage of this amendment, the Illinois General Assembly could raise rates to this level, with the same process as any other state bill, needing only to pass both chambers of the state legislature and then either be signed by the governor or receive a veto override.

"If approved, the upcoming ballot measure would move Illinois from having the fifth-highest state corporate income tax rate to the second-highest."

If approved, the upcoming ballot measure would move Illinois from having the fifth-highest state corporate income tax rate to the second-highest, because Iowa will be simultaneously cutting their state corporate income tax rate from 12 percent to 9.8 percent beginning in 2021.[2]

Employers in Illinois are reasonably apprehensive about the proposed constitutional change and higher

[2] Janelle Cammenga, "State Corporate Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2019," Tax Foundation, February 27, 2019, https://taxfoundation.org/state-corporate-rates-brackets-2019/

income tax rates. The elevated constitutional ceiling for the corporate income tax rate would also pose a potential threat to future business and would deter firms from coming to the state.

The tax structure that would be imposed by Senate Bill 687 includes several atypical and undesirable provisions that would create further problems for Illinoisans. Tax rates are typically marginal, meaning only incomes above a certain threshold are taxed at a higher rate. For example, using the tax rates presented in Table 1 (see page 5), an Illinoisan with $50,000 in taxable income would be taxed at 4.75 percent for the first $10,000 of that income and at 4.90 percent on the remaining $40,000 of taxable income. However, for income earners in the highest tax bracket (taxable income greater than $750,000 for an individual filer or $1,000,000 for joint filers), Senate Bill 687 would impose a flat 7.99 percent tax rate that would be applied to *all* income, not just income above $750,000/$1,000,000 (individual/joint). This corresponds to an additional $8,545/$8,965 (individual/joint) in tax burden on those with taxable incomes in the highest tax bracket. This would create a tax cliff, one in which a higher taxable income could result in less after-tax income. Under such a tax system, any Illinoisan with taxable income greater than $740,815 and not more than $750,000 would take home more after taxes than would an Illinoisan with a taxable income of $750,001.

"The elevated constitutional ceiling for the corporate income tax rate would also pose a potential threat to future business and would deter firms from coming to the state."

"Bracket creep" is another undesirable problem the Fair Tax would introduce. The proposed tax brackets are not indexed for inflation, meaning that as incomes rise due to inflation, the income tax brackets would remain constant. As a result, Illinois taxpayers would pay an ever-increasing share of their personal incomes in taxes, despite not actually experiencing income growth in real terms.

The tax brackets that would be imposed by Senate Bill 687 would also be problematic for joint filers because of a problem typically referred to as the "marriage penalty." The income thresholds imposed on joint filers vary only slightly from the thresholds imposed on individual filers, meaning that two earners would owe more taxes by filing jointly than they would if they filed individually.

As an example, take a household with two income earners, each making $250,000 in taxable income. Filing separately, each individual would owe $12,310 in income taxes, or $24,620 total. However, when filing jointly, the second earner's full $250,000 income would be taxed at 7.75 percent, leading to a total tax bill of $31,685, a $7,065 increase in income tax burden imposed as a result of filing jointly.

Illinois Is Already a High-Tax State

Table 2
Illinois' Rank Before and After the Progressive Tax

Category	Current	Pritzker's Progressive Tax
Top Personal Marginal Income Tax Rate	18th	42nd
Top Corporate Marginal Income Tax Rate	46th	49th
Sales Tax Burden	45th	45th
Property Tax Burden	49th	49th
Credit Rating	50th	50th
Domestic Migration, Percentage	49th	50th
Gasoline Tax Rate	48th	48th
"Rainy Day" Fund	50th	50th
Public Pension Funding Ratio	48th	48th
Overall Tax Burden	47th	48th
State and Local Debt per Capita	46th	46th
ALEC-Laffer Competitiveness	47th	49th

Table 2 shows how tax rates in Illinois today rank among the states and how they would rank if the Pritzker tax were to become law. Illinois already has extremely high property, sales, and corporate income tax rates without the Pritzker tax scheme.

Despite increases in state tax receipts imposed over the years, spending increases in Illinois have outpaced revenue growth. In fact, Illinois has already raised income taxes twice in the past decade. The publication *Rich States, Poor States* ranks Illinois 48th-worst among the 50 states for economic outlook, due in large part to its high total tax burden.

Those with higher incomes have more to lose from higher tax rates, and their greater disposable income makes it easier for them to move out of state. Although Illinois is losing residents from every income bracket, those with annual earnings of $200,000 or more are leaving the state at about twice the rate of the average Illinoisan.[3] This effect has been exacerbated by the federal tax reform that capped the SALT deduction at $10,000. Since the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, the effect of the top marginal personal income tax rate on domestic migration has increased by 74 percent. The cap on SALT deductions would cause Illinois residents to feel the full brunt of the proposed tax increase, amplifying its effects. This means high state income tax rates are much more harmful to Illinois' people and economy, and the resulting outmigration and job destruction would be felt even faster.

From 2014 to 2019, Illinois recorded a net population loss every year, as well as a total net loss for the decade. It was the largest total decline of any state during the same period, and only West Virginia suffered a larger percentage decline. Pennsylvania, consequently, has supplanted Illinois as the fifth most populous state.[4] Illinois will lose at least one seat in Congress because of this extreme outmigration.

The United Van Lines survey provides anecdotal evidence to add to the Census data and confirms that Illinois is among the nation's leading states for outmigration.[5] Taxes are often cited by those surveyed as the reason for leaving the state. Some claim people are moving to

[3] U.S. Internal Revenue Service, "SOI Tax Stats, Migration Data," irs.gov, accessed October 27, 2020, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-migration-data

[4] U.S. Census Bureau, "State Population Totals: 2010-2019," census.gov, accessed October 26, 2020, https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-state-total.html

[5] United Van Lines, "Annual 2019 United Van Lines National Movers Study," unitedvanlines.com, accessed October 26, 2020, https://www.unitedvanlines.com/newsroom/movers-study-2019

warmer climates, and there may be some evidence for that, such as those who move to Florida, but that fails to explain why Illinois is experiencing annual net losses of population to all five of its neighboring states as well, including Wisconsin, which is farther north. Mass departure has become so pronounced that Illinois has had roughly as many people moving away as dying.

Despite numerous tax increases that have resulted in Illinois having one of the nation's highest overall tax burdens, the state still cannot manage to balance its budget. The state last had a balanced budget in 2001. In 2017, the budget deficit was greater than $7.5 billion. While spending has grown, so have the unpaid bills: Illinois has amassed a bill backlog of more than $7 billion. The unfunded pension liability situation is even worse. Illinois had more than $130 billion in unfunded pension liabilities in 2019. The General Assembly Retirement System is about 85 percent unfunded.[6] The state's massive debt problem is so bad that Illinois has the lowest investment grade credit rating (one notch above junk) and a negative outlook from all three major nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs), indicating it will likely be the first and only state to be downgraded to sub-investment grade. (Standard & Poor's, in particular, has cast serious doubts on the ability of the progressive tax to raise the predicted revenue and has indicated that passage of the progressive tax will likely not save Illinois from the infamy of being a junk-bond issuer.) Over time, it has become increasingly clear to NRSROs and investors alike that if the state does not cut spending soon, the only way out for Illinois would be default.

Faced with skyrocketing yield demands from investors earlier in 2020, Illinois was the first in line to borrow from the new Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) at the Federal Reserve, selling $1.2 billion in bonds to the central bank. To date, Illinois remains the only state to utilize the Lender of Last Resort program, and the Land of Lincoln is now poised to borrow nearly another $5 billion, for two reasons. First, a federal bailout, upon which the Illinois budget is explicitly relying, is highly unlikely at this point. Second, municipal bond investors are highly likely to punish Illinois again with the same yields those investors demanded in May, north of 5.8 percent. A slightly lower rate at the Fed's MLF is the only alternative.

The mishandling of Illinois' finances has had devastating effects on the state's residents, even beyond out-migration and mounting debt. Poor policy decisions have created an environment in which Illinois' economy has lagged behind that of the nation as a whole. From 2010 through 2019, only in November 2010 did Illinois' unemployment rate fall below the national average. For the other 119 months of the decade, Illinois underperformed compared to the nation at large.[7] And in the years before 2010, Illinois often had a higher unemployment rate than the national average.

The condition of Illinois' housing market is another indicator of how the state has consistently trailed the rest of the nation. In July 2020, the most recent data point available for Chicago's home price index, the index was 145.6—less than it was almost 16 years ago, in October 2004, when it was 146. Additionally, in 2018, Chicago had more "underwater" mortgages than any other metro area in the country.[8]

The anemic housing recovery in Illinois, which is reflected in the numbers previously discussed, has been driven by the state's tax policy, both directly and indirectly. Taxes, especially property taxes, leave a resident with less money to afford housing, and the high tax levels drive people out of the state, keeping down the demand for housing and indirectly putting downward pressure on home prices.

[6] Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability, "Monthly Briefing for the Month Ended: November 2017," last accessed October 27, 2020, https://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/1117revenue_special_pension_briefing.pdf

[7] U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Unemployment Rate in Illinois [ILUR]," retrieved from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in October 2020; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Unemployment Rate [UNRATE]," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in October 2020.

[8] Darcel Rockett, "Chicago Has More Underwater Homes than Any Other U.S. Metro Area, Report Finds," *Chicago Tribune*, June 5, 2018, https://www.chicagotribune.com/real-estate/ct-re-chicago-underwater-mortgages-20180603-story.html

Illinois' Inglorious Tax History

As we discussed in the previous section, Illinois is already an exceedingly high-tax jurisdiction, and the steady rise in Illinois tax burdens has played a major role in the state's economic decline. For most of the twentieth century, Illinois had no income tax, even though several states had adopted an income tax during the first half of the century. The Illinois government, like other tax-increasing governments, wanted an income tax, but it was blocked by a 1932 Illinois Supreme Court decision that ruled an income tax was unconstitutional.[9] However, in 1969, lawmakers overcame this hurdle, creating a state personal income tax rate of 2.5 percent. (See Figure 4.)[10]

From 1954 through 1962, state and local taxes in Illinois rose substantially even without an income tax. The primary contributors to Illinois' ever-increasing tax burden were mostly increases and changes to the sales tax code. In 1955, Illinois adopted a use tax to recoup lost sales tax revenues from out-of-state shoppers. Alas, once 1969 rolled around, the new income tax became a breakthrough event for tax increases.

Figure 4
Illinois State and Local Tax Revenues as a Share of Personal Income[10]
(annual, 1950-2018)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis

[9] *Bachrach v. Nelson*, 182 N.E. 909 (Ill. 1932).

[10] Data points from 1950-52 and 1954-56 were interpolated due to an incomplete dataset.

On July 1, 1969, more than 50 years ago, Gov. Richard Ogilvie, a Republican, signed into law a 2.5 percent flat-rate tax on personal income and a 4 percent tax rate on corporate income. Figure 4 shows the changes in total tax revenues collected by Illinois' state and local governments as a share of the state's personal income from 1950 to the present. Without context, Figure 4 may seem like a big win for those advocating for income taxes, but remember from the Laffer Curve, higher tax rates have two effects: (1) more tax revenue per dollar of tax base and (2) a smaller tax base.

Sometimes, it takes a little time for supply-side responses to take hold. In the case of Illinois, the Laffer Curve sought its own version of revenge. Figure 4 only tells us that tax revenues increased *relative* to income. What Figure 4 does not show is the damaging impact higher tax rates had on the tax base even before, and definitely after, the creation of the state's income tax. Figure 5 plots Illinois' personal income relative to U.S. personal income from 1950 to 2019.[11]

As shown in Figure 5, from 1950 through 1969, Illinois declined relative to the rest of the nation by a little less than 1 percentage point (from 6.9 percent in 1950 to 6.1 percent in 1969). Remember that it was in 1969 that the Illinois government adopted its first personal income tax. Unsurprisingly, this plan backfired and left Illinois residents reeling from the fallout. After all, every dollar taxed is a dollar removed from personal income.

In just 16 years, from 1969 to 1985, Illinois' personal income went from 6.1 percent of U.S. personal income to 5 percent. By 2010, after another 25 years, Illinois'

Figure 5
Illinois Personal Income as a Share of Total U.S. Personal Income[11]
(annual, 1950-2019)



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Illinois Department of Revenue

11 Figure 5 uses personal income rather than gross state product because personal income data are more readily available.

personal income dropped to 4.3 percent of U.S. personal income. As of 2019, Illinois sits at just 4 percent of aggregate U.S. personal income.

Since 1976, among all U.S. states, Illinois has had the fourth-lowest growth in employment, the 10th-worst growth in GSP, the fifth-worst rate of personal income growth, and the sixth-lowest increase in labor force. In 2019, Illinois had an average unemployment rate of 4 percent, ranking 38th. In August 2020, Illinois' unemployment rate was 11 percent, well above the 8.4 percent national unemployment rate.

The Negative Effects of High Tax Rates

If you want less of something, tax it. Policymakers tax smokers to get them to stop smoking. They tax speeders on the freeway to get them to stop speeding. Why, then, would anyone want to tax jobs, employment, and output? Of course, we tax jobs, employment, and output to generate revenue to provide government services rather than to discourage jobs, employment, and output. But that does not change the fact that taxing income—or anything else, for that matter—is a surefire way to ensure you generate less income.

Many politicians, those from Illinois included, do not realize that policies shape the economic environment and affect population and income growth, and thus tax revenue growth. Taxes affect (1) the size of the tax base (income), (2) the composition of income, (3) the location of income, and (4) the timing of income. Taxes tell people what not to do, and welfare tells people what to do. Illinois' government has effectively been advertising its state as a place that taxes work, output, and employment and subsidizes non-work, leisure, and unemployment. Illinois has been doing this for an awfully long time. Naturally, the market has responded.

Although some dispute the proposition that high tax rates have substantial negative effects on migration and a state economy, our book *The Wealth of States* cites more than 100 academic studies in prestigious economic journals that, on balance, confirm these adverse consequences are real.[12] Higher tax rates at the local, state, or national level are deleterious to growth in a jurisdiction's incomes, population, and jobs.

Lessons from Other States Can Predict the Future

History shows income taxes, more than sales or property taxes,[13] have a substantial detrimental effect on economic growth and prosperity. The effects are universally felt. Table 3 shows a comparison of each of the 11 states (including Illinois) that adopted an income tax after 1960, along with the other 39 states. Since 1964 (five years before Illinois adopted a personal income tax), Illinois' share of the U.S. population relative to the other 39 states fell by 38.5 percent, GSP share fell by 45.7 percent, and state and local tax revenue share dropped by 37.4 percent. Illinois is not unique in suffering from the adoption of an income tax. Every one of the other 10 states had a similar experience.

[12] Laffer, Moore, Sinquefield, and Brown, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of States* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2014).

[13] It is worth noting the distinction between tax rates and taxes paid. Property tax rates have a much more detrimental impact than income tax rates, but people typically pay far less in property taxes than in income taxes because of the large rate differential. Hence, income taxes have a greater effect. Sales taxes have relatively little effect in either case. See Antoni, *Fiscal Triumvirate* (Champaign, IL: Illinois University Press, 2020).

Take Connecticut, for example. Connecticut was the most recent state to impose a state-level income tax, which occurred in 1991. Five years before imposing the tax, Connecticut was growing at a rate that outpaced most other states, and its population was 1.8 percent of the population of the 39 states not listed in the table above. Now, Connecticut's population sits at 1.4 percent of the population of the other 39 states. Similarly, Connecticut's GSP was 2.4 percent of the 39-state cohort in 1986 and is now down to 1.7 percent. State and local revenue dropped from 2.4 percent to 1.6 percent.

The similarities between Illinois and Connecticut do not end there. The last state to switch from a flat-rate personal income tax to a progressive personal income tax (as Illinois is poised to do) was Connecticut, which switched tax structures in 1996.

In the 10 years prior to adopting its income tax (1981-1991), Connecticut experienced rapid economic growth. Employment grew by 14.9 percent, personal income grew by 103.1 percent, and GSP grew by 122.3 percent. From 1991 to 1996 (the years Connecticut imposed a flat-rate personal income tax), employment fell by 4.3 percent, personal income grew by just 26.1 percent, and GSP grew by 27.2 percent. In the 10 years following the switch to a graduated personal income tax (1996-2006), Connecticut's economic growth was suppressed compared to the pre-tax period of 1981-1991. From 1996 to 2006, employment growth was just 6.3 percent, personal income grew by 72.1 percent, and GSP grew by 72.6 percent. These growth figures all pale in comparison to the booming growth experienced in Connecticut prior to the creation of the state's income tax.

Other studies further corroborate the negative impact that switching to a progressive personal income tax had on Connecticut's economy. As pointed out by the Illinois Policy Institute, switching from a flat tax to a progressive income tax significantly impaired the growth in housing values in Connecticut: "A decade after the tax hikes, housing prices had appreciated 46% less when compared to similar nearby states such as Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New Jersey. By 2019, the gap was even larger: average housing prices in Connecticut had appreciated by 70% relative to 144% housing appreciation—less than half—the growth in housing values in similar nearby states."[14]

Table 3

The 11 States that Introduced an Income Tax Since 1961

		Maximum Tax Rate		Share of Remaining 39 States: Population			GSP			Total State and Local Revenue		
	First Year of the Tax	Initial	Current	5 Years Before	2019	% Change	5 Years Before	2019	% Change	5 Years Before	2017	% Change
Connecticut	1991	1.50%	6.99%	1.8%	1.4%	-22.8%	2.4%	1.7%	-27.5%	2.4%	1.6%	-31.2%
New Jersey	1976	2.50%	10.75%	4.9%	3.5%	-29.5%	5.4%	3.8%	-28.9%	5.4%	3.8%	-29.4%
Ohio	1972	3.50%	4.80%	7.6%	4.6%	-39.6%	8.0%	4.2%	-47.8%	6.1%	4.6%	-24.0%
Rhode Island	1971	5.25%	5.99%	0.7%	0.4%	-38.9%	0.6%	0.4%	-41.8%	0.7%	0.4%	-35.6%
Pennsylvania	1971	2.30%	3.07%	8.5%	5.0%	-41.0%	8.5%	4.9%	-42.6%	7.7%	4.9%	-36.3%
Maine	1969	6.00%	7.15%	0.7%	0.5%	-28.8%	0.6%	0.4%	-29.7%	0.6%	0.5%	-21.6%
Illinois	1969	2.50%	4.95%	8.1%	5.0%	-38.5%	9.8%	5.3%	-45.7%	7.8%	4.9%	-37.4%
Nebraska	1968	2.60%	6.84%	1.1%	0.8%	-31.1%	1.0%	0.8%	-24.0%	0.9%	0.8%	-14.0%
Michigan	1967	2.00%	4.25%	6.3%	3.9%	-38.1%	7.9%	3.2%	-58.9%	6.6%	3.6%	-45.9%
Indiana	1963	2.00%	3.23%	3.8%	2.6%	-30.5%	3.8%	2.3%	-40.0%	3.4%	2.1%	-38.6%
West Virginia	1961	5.40%	6.50%	1.5%	0.7%	-54.4%	1.2%	0.5%	-60.1%	1.1%	0.7%	-39.5%

Source: BEA, U.S. Census Bureau

[14] Orphe Divounguy, Bryce Hill, and Jon Josko, "Progressive Tax Could Cost Nearly $1,800 a Year in Home Equity," Illinois Policy Institute, N.D. listed, accessed October 27, 2020, https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/progressive-tax-could-cost-nearly-1800-a-year-in-home-equity

Income Migration

Figure 6 uses IRS tax return data from 2006-2016 to show the migration of adjusted gross income (AGI) into and out of Illinois, New York, and New Jersey (colored white). States to which Illinois, New Jersey, and New York lost combined AGI are colored red. As Figure 6 shows, the trio lost net-AGI to every single state. We predict the passage of Constitutional Amendment 1 would increase the outflow of AGI from Illinois, as high-income earners would have even more incentives to flee the anti-growth policies of Illinois.Illinois' story is not new. Table 4 (see page 15) uses the same IRS migration data for each state from 1992 to 2016. Each column represents a three-year period and identifies the net amount of AGI that left or entered each state as a share of average AGI filed within that state. Data presented in green represent net in-flows of AGI and data presented in red represent net out-flows of AGI. Over the 24-year period, Illinois languished at the bottom of the pack, year in and year out, and 12.4 percent of Illinois' AGI has left the state since the 1992 tax year. Gov. Pritzker can expect this capital flight to worsen if his "Fair Tax" is approved.

Illinois' population growth rate of 0.0 percent since 2008 is ranked 49th in the nation—only besting West Virginia. Over the most recent 10-year period for which data are available, Illinois ranked 48th in domestic net migration, having lost more than 900,000 residents, which is equivalent to about 7 percent of the state's total population in 2010. No matter how you measure it, people are leaving Illinois at rates unmatched by almost every other state. Despite an ever-declining population, Illinois lawmakers believe that raising the income tax rate would fix all of that state's problems. But you cannot raise tax revenues if there is nobody left to tax.

Plotted in Figure 7 are indexed values of the share of U.S. population residing in Illinois and select U.S. states from 1976 to 2019.

Chicago, once the second largest city in the U.S., is not immune to the migration impact of poor fiscal policies. Figure 8 plots the share of U.S. population living in the Chicago metropolitan area. Prior to the adoption of an Illinois state income tax, Chicago was expanding relative to the rest of the United States. Chicago's decline began exactly when the state adopted its income tax in 1969. In 2017, Chicago lost a net of 156 people per day.[15]

Illinois shares a land border with five states—Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, and Wisconsin. Over the past decade, all these states have implemented tax rate reductions.

Indiana has been steadily decreasing its corporate income tax rate since 2012. Once as high as 8.5 percent, Indiana's corporate rate is on track to be reduced to 4.9 percent by July 1, 2021 (fiscal year 2022).[17] Indiana's personal income tax rate has also been reduced, from 3.4 percent to 3.23 percent, in the past decade.[18]

In 2018, Iowa Gov. Kim Reynolds signed several large income tax reductions into law. Iowa's highest marginal personal income tax rate of 8.98 percent will be reduced to 6.5 percent by 2023. Combined with Illinois' potential tax rate increases, Iowa could tax income at a lower rate than Illinois in just a few years. Iowa's cor-

[15] *Crain's Chicago Business*, "Sweet Home Chicago Sours as 156 Residents Leave Daily," December 14, 2018, https://www.chicagobusiness.com/news/sweet-home-chicago-sours-156-residents-leave-daily

[16] Data poins for 1951-1959 and 1961-1968 were interpolated based on decennial Census data.

[17] Indiana Department of Revenue, "Corporate Tax and Sales Tax History," in.gov, accessed October 2020, https://www.in.gov/dor/business-tax/tax-rates-fees-and-penalties/corporate-tax-and-sales-tax-history

[18] Joseph Bishop-Henchman, "Indiana Approves Income Tax Reduction," Tax Foundation, May 14, 2013, https://taxfoundation.org/indiana-approves-income-tax-reduction

Figure 6

Illinois, New Jersey, and New York Aggregate Net-AGI Flow

(2006-2016)

NY

RI

NJ

DE

MD

IL

HI

States losing AGI to Illinois, New Jersey and Ney York

Illinois, New Jersey and New York

States gaining AGI from Illinois, New Jersey and New York

Source: IRS

Green means the state(s) in white had a positive net inflow from the green state. Red means the state(s) in white lost AGI to that state.

Table 4

Net In AGI as a % of State AGI Filed (Three-year periods)

92-95		95-98		98-01		01-04		04-07		07-10		10-13		13-16		Sum of % of Net AGI Gained (Lost) due to migration from '92/'93 to '15/'16		
NV	11.5%	NV	11.4%	NV	9.7%	NV	9.2%	NV	6.5%	SC	4.2%	FL	4.9%	FL	7.7%	1	NV	30.7%
AZ	8.2%	AZ	6.9%	FL	6.0%	FL	6.9%	AZ	6.2%	MT	3.9%	SC	4.1%	NV	5.4%	2	FL	27.2%
ID	6.2%	FL	5.6%	AZ	5.8%	AZ	5.2%	FL	6.0%	WY	3.2%	NV	3.8%	SC	5.0%	3	AZ	21.7%
CO	5.5%	CO	3.9%	CO	3.6%	MT	3.7%	SC	5.3%	FL	2.9%	WY	3.0%	ID	2.9%	4	SC	20.9%
FL	5.4%	NC	3.6%	NH	3.3%	ID	3.2%	ID	4.8%	NC	2.6%	MT	2.6%	AZ	2.9%	5	ID	15.7%
MT	4.6%	SC	3.4%	ID	3.1%	SC	3.2%	NC	3.9%	AZ	2.4%	ID	2.5%	OR	2.7%	6	MT	14.3%
NC	4.0%	ID	3.2%	SC	3.1%	NH	3.1%	MT	3.2%	NV	2.0%	AZ	2.5%	MT	2.5%	7	NC	13.6%
NM	3.9%	GA	2.9%	WY	2.9%	ME	3.1%	WY	2.9%	CO	2.0%	CO	2.0%	CO	2.3%	8	WY	12.3%
GA	3.9%	OR	2.3%	NC	2.6%	WY	2.6%	OR	2.7%	TX	1.7%	TX	2.0%	NC	2.0%	9	CO	11.6%
OR	3.9%	WY	2.3%	ME	2.4%	NC	1.8%	TN	2.6%	SD	1.6%	NC	1.9%	WY	2.0%	10	OR	9.7%
AR	3.5%	NH	2.3%	VT	2.1%	DE	1.7%	WA	2.3%	TN	1.6%	ND	1.8%	WA	1.9%	11	TN	8.9%
UT	3.2%	WA	2.2%	MT	1.6%	OR	1.4%	CO	2.1%	WA	1.4%	WA	1.4%	TN	1.9%	12	NH	8.2%
TN	2.9%	TN	1.9%	GA	1.5%	VT	1.4%	NM	2.0%	OR	1.4%	HI	1.4%	TX	1.5%	13	WA	7.6%
WA	2.8%	MT	1.9%	DE	0.9%	NM	1.3%	UT	1.8%	ID	1.3%	OR	1.2%	DE	1.3%	14	TX	6.3%
WY	2.5%	VT	1.4%	WA	0.8%	HI	1.3%	AR	1.8%	NM	1.0%	TN	1.1%	UT	1.3%	15	GA	6.2%
SC	2.3%	TX	1.2%	TN	0.8%	TN	1.1%	NH	1.8%	UT	1.0%	ME	0.9%	HI	1.0%	16	ME	5.7%
VT	1.8%	AR	1.1%	OR	0.7%	AR	1.1%	TX	1.8%	DE	1.0%	SD	0.9%	SD	0.7%	17	DE	5.6%
NH	1.8%	ME	0.8%	AR	0.6%	WA	0.8%	GA	1.7%	AL	0.9%	NH	0.7%	NH	0.6%	18	SD	4.3%
SD	1.7%	MS	0.8%	TX	0.6%	GA	0.7%	DE	1.6%	AR	0.8%	UT	0.7%	ME	0.4%	19	AR	4.2%
MS	1.3%	UT	0.7%	VA	0.6%	VA	0.7%	SD	1.4%	GA	0.8%	DE	0.5%	GA	0.4%	20	UT	4.0%
TX	1.2%	AL	0.5%	SD	0.4%	RI	0.7%	AL	1.2%	OK	0.5%	OK	0.3%	AL	-0.3%	21	VT	2.8%
AL	1.0%	KY	0.1%	RI	0.1%	SD	0.6%	VT	0.9%	WV	0.2%	AL	0.2%	AR	-0.3%	22	AL	2.2%
KY	0.7%	DE	0.0%	CA	-0.1%	CO	0.5%	ME	0.7%	KY	0.2%	GA	0.0%	CA	-0.4%	23	NM	1.0%
DE	0.7%	VA	-0.3%	KY	-0.1%	TX	0.4%	KY	0.4%	VT	0.2%	KY	0.0%	OK	-0.5%	24	HI	0.3%
WV	0.5%	OK	-0.3%	MS	-0.1%	AL	0.4%	HI	0.3%	NH	0.2%	AR	-0.2%	ND	-0.7%	25	KY	0.0%
VA	0.5%	MO	-0.3%	WI	-0.3%	WV	0.3%	WV	0.3%	VA	0.1%	CA	-0.4%	MO	-0.8%	26	MS	-0.6%
WI	0.5%	SD	-0.4%	AL	-0.4%	KY	0.2%	OK	0.1%	MS	0.1%	VT	-0.5%	MI	-0.8%	27	OK	-1.4%
IN	0.4%	NM	-0.4%	MA	-0.7%	MS	0.2%	MS	0.0%	ME	0.0%	IA	-0.5%	KY	-0.9%	28	VA	-1.4%
MO	0.3%	IN	-0.5%	MN	-0.7%	WI	0.0%	MO	-0.1%	HI	-0.1%	IN	-0.5%	IN	-0.9%	29	WV	-2.3%
MN	0.3%	WI	-0.5%	MO	-0.8%	PA	-0.4%	VA	-0.4%	LA	-0.2%	MS	-0.6%	IA	-0.9%	30	MO	-2.6%
ME	-0.3%	WV	-0.7%	MD	-0.8%	MO	-0.4%	PA	-0.4%	MO	-0.3%	LA	-0.6%	WI	-1.0%	31	WI	-3.0%
OK	-0.4%	MA	-0.7%	UT	-0.9%	MD	-0.5%	WI	-0.6%	PA	-0.3%	PA	-0.7%	LA	-1.0%	32	IN	-3.8%
KS	-0.6%	KS	-0.8%	IN	-1.0%	UT	-0.6%	IN	-0.7%	IA	-0.3%	VA	-0.7%	VT	-1.1%	33	PA	-4.2%
PA	-0.6%	MN	-0.8%	HI	-1.1%	CT	-0.6%	MN	-0.9%	ND	-0.4%	MO	-0.7%	MA	-1.2%	34	ND	-4.4%
NE	-0.7%	MI	-0.9%	PA	-1.1%	MN	-0.8%	IA	-0.9%	CA	-0.6%	WV	-0.8%	MS	-1.2%	35	CA	-4.4%
MD	-0.8%	CA	-1.0%	MI	-1.2%	OK	-0.9%	KS	-1.0%	IN	-0.7%	WI	-0.8%	MN	-1.2%	36	MN	-4.4%
IA	-0.9%	PA	-1.2%	WV	-1.3%	IN	-0.9%	NE	-1.2%	MA	-0.7%	NE	-0.8%	NE	-1.3%	37	IA	-5.6%
OH	-1.0%	OH	-1.3%	CT	-1.5%	MI	-1.1%	CT	-1.5%	MN	-0.7%	MI	-1.0%	RI	-1.3%	38	MA	-6.3%
MI	-1.0%	IA	-1.5%	OK	-1.6%	CA	-1.1%	AK	-1.6%	WI	-0.8%	NM	-1.0%	WV	-1.3%	39	KS	-6.6%
LA	-1.2%	NE	-1.5%	NJ	-1.7%	LA	-1.1%	ND	-1.8%	KS	-0.9%	MN	-1.0%	PA	-1.4%	40	NE	-6.8%
MA	-1.3%	MD	-1.5%	NM	-1.8%	NJ	-1.2%	MD	-1.8%	NE	-0.9%	MA	-1.1%	KS	-1.4%	41	MD	-7.1%
NJ	-1.6%	LA	-1.6%	OH	-1.9%	IA	-1.4%	CA	-1.9%	MD	-1.0%	KS	-1.1%	OH	-1.5%	42	LA	-7.7%
ND	-1.8%	NJ	-1.8%	KS	-2.0%	NE	-1.4%	IL	-1.9%	AK	-1.1%	OH	-1.4%	NM	-1.5%	43	RI	-8.2%
CT	-1.9%	RI	-1.9%	IA	-2.2%	OH	-1.5%	OH	-2.0%	DC	-1.2%	RI	-1.4%	VA	-1.5%	44	MI	-8.6%
IL	-1.9%	CT	-2.0%	LA	-2.5%	AK	-1.6%	MI	-2.3%	CT	-1.3%	MD	-1.5%	MD	-2.0%	45	OH	-9.0%
HI	-2.1%	IL	-2.3%	IL	-2.5%	KS	-1.6%	NJ	-2.5%	IL	-1.4%	NJ	-1.9%	NY	-2.7%	46	CT	-10.5%
RI	-3.4%	ND	-2.5%	NE	-2.6%	MA	-2.1%	MA	-2.5%	NJ	-1.6%	NY	-2.1%	NJ	-2.8%	47	NJ	-10.5%
CA	-3.5%	HI	-2.9%	NY	-2.8%	IL	-2.2%	RI	-2.8%	OH	-1.7%	IL	-2.4%	AK	-3.0%	48	IL	-12.4%
AK	-3.7%	AK	-3.4%	DC	-3.2%	ND	-2.3%	NY	-3.5%	RI	-2.2%	CT	-2.9%	IL	-3.2%	49	AK	-13.5%
NY	-3.8%	NY	-3.8%	AK	-3.5%	NY	-3.1%	DC	-3.5%	NY	-2.2%	AK	-3.9%	CT	-3.3%	50	NY	-13.8%
DC	-12.1%	DC	-9.8%	ND	-3.8%	DC	-5.9%	LA	-4.2%	MI	-2.8%	DC	-4.4%	DC	-3.9%	51	DC	-19.6%



porate income tax rate will also be decreased, from 12 percent to 9.8 percent, on January 1, 2021.[19] Reynolds further aimed to implement additional tax reductions through her proposed Invest in Iowa Act, but these plans were derailed by the COVID-19 pandemic.[20] There is still hope that these further tax reductions will be reintroduced at a later date, a move that would surely draw more Illinois residents to Iowa.

In 2018, Kentucky initiated income tax reforms that changed personal and corporate income taxes. Both taxes were altered from being progressive taxes with a top rate of 6 percent to flat taxes assessed at a 5 percent rate.[21]

Missouri has also put into effect a series of personal and corporate income tax reductions. Missouri's top

[19] Deloitte, "Iowa Enacts Income Tax and Sales/Use Tax Changes," *External Multistate Tax Alert*, June 18, 2018, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/Tax/us-tax-iowa-enacts-income-tax-and-sales-use-tax-changes.pdf

[20] John Hendrickson and Jonathan Williams, "Iowa Has a Golden Opportunity for Pro-Growth Tax Reform in 2020," *Des Moines Register*, February 13, 2020, https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/iowa-view/2020/02/13/iowa-pro-growth-tax-reform-2020-invest-iowa-act-reynolds/4752012002

[21] Morgan Scarboro, "Kentucky Legislature Overrides Governor's Veto to Pass Tax Reform Package," Tax Foundation, April 16, 2018, https://taxfoundation.org/kentucky-tax-reform-package

Figure 8
Chicago Metropolitan Statistical Area Population as a Share of U.S. Population[16]
(annual, 1950-2018)



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Census Bureau

marginal personal income tax rate has been reduced from 5.9 percent to 5.4 percent, with a further reduction to a 5.1 percent rate on the way.[22] Further, the corporate income tax rate has been reduced from 6.5 percent to 4 percent.[23]

Wisconsin has also lowered income tax rates in recent years. Since 2012, the top marginal tax rate has been reduced from 7.75 percent to 7.65 percent, and the lowest marginal tax rate has been reduced from 4.6 percent to 4 percent.[24]

All five states that border Illinois are improving their tax code. Illinois has been losing residents to these states for many years, and this trend will only be exacerbated by the anti-growth policies adopted by Illinois policymakers and the pro-growth policies adopted by Illinois' neighbors.

22 Missouri Department of Revenue, "Individual Income Tax Year Changes," dor.mo.gov, last accessed October 27, 2020, https://dor.mo.gov/personal/whatsnew/#:~:text=Missouri%20Standard%20Deduction&text=Below%20are%20the%20standard%20deduction,Married%20Filing%20Separate%20%2D%20%2412%2C200
23 Missouri Department of Revenue, "Corporate Income Tax Year Changes," dor.mo.gov, last accessed October 27, 2020, https://dor.mo.gov/business/corporate/whatsnew
24 Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, "Individual Income Tax," January 2019, https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lfb/informational_papers/january_2019/0002_individual_income_tax_informational_paper_2.pdf

It is not just people leaving the state, either. Companies are also moving their headquarters to escape the toxic business environment of Illinois. The tax rate increases that could result from Constitutional Amendment 1 would not help the cause. This constitutional amendment would be imposed in addition to other anti-growth policies recently adopted in Illinois.[24] In 2019, Illinois doubled the state's gasoline tax from 19 cents per gallon to 38 cents per gallon, imposing a significant burden on Illinois drivers and business owners.[25] Additionally, a plan to raise the minimum wage to $15 per hour by 2025, was signed by the governor in 2019, a move that will weaken the viability of small businesses in the state.[26] All this out-migration of people and businesses has a compounding effect on economic conditions. You need jobs to attract people, and you need people to attract jobs.

Illinois Has a Spending Problem, Not a Revenue Shortage

We have outlined countless deleterious effects that come with tax hikes. Then why on Earth would Illinois worsen its tax code? The answer lies in Illinois' dire need for new tax revenues.

On June 6, 2019, Gov. Pritzker signed a 2020 fiscal year state budget that shows state coffers with as much as a $1.3 billion deficit, even after accounting for almost $1.1 billion in projected new revenues from various tax and fee increases.[28] Unfortunately for Pritzker, the new tax changes will not result in such a windfall of new tax revenues. Migration out of Illinois, lost jobs, and lost businesses will restrict the tax base and will limit new tax revenues well below the static estimate of $1.1 billion.

Budget woes have long troubled Illinois because politicians like spending more than producing sustainable growth. FY 2020 is the 19th consecutive year Illinois has had a budget deficit. Figure 9 shows each state's budget surplus as a share of state spending over the latest 10-year period for which data are available. Illinois is second from the bottom, only "bested" by New Jersey.

Many of the problems currently plaguing the Prairie State stem from the state's misaligned incentive structure. Businesses and workers want to be located where they get the most benefit for their efforts after tax. Work is more rewarding when government taxes you less. Over the years, Illinois has become known as a high-tax state whose government tends to spend way too much money. The only way Illinois could become worse is by raising taxes even higher, as it intends to do.

Budget, revenue, and economic growth issues always spell trouble for public pensions. Illinois is no exception. Figure 10 plots the funding ratio for Illinois and the U.S. state rankings are shown above the line. Illinois' best performance was 46th out of 50 in 2004, and its highest funding ratio was at an abysmal 62.6 percent in 2007. The funding ratio has been falling almost every year since 2007 and fell to a low of 35.6 percent in 2016. Unfortunately, the victims of these bad policies are not the politicians who caused them.

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[25] Anna Marie Kukec, "Illinois Loses Out as Companies Move Out," *U.S. News & World Report*, March 23, 2018, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2018-03-15/companies-want-out-of-illinois

[26] Brittany De Lea, "Illinois Tax Hikes Could Kill Small Businesses, Expert Warns," Fox Business, July 1, 2019, https://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/illinois-tax-hikes-could-drive-out-small-business

[27] CBS Chicago, "Pritzker Signs Law Raising Illinois Minimum Wage to $15 an Hour by 2025," February 19, 2019, https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2019/02/19/jb-pritzker-illinois-minimum-wage-15-dollars-an-hour

[28] Adam Schuster, "Pritzker Signs Illinois Budget out of Balance by up to $1.3 Billion," Illinois Policy Institute, June 11, 2019, https://www.illinoispolicy.org/pritzker-signs-illinois-budget-out-of-balance-by-up-to-1-3-billion



For a more in-depth look, Table 5 shows the state's pension fund liabilities, assets, net indebtedness, funding ratio, and funding ratio's rank in the United States. The state is making promises it cannot keep. Note the growth in liabilities from 2008-2013 and then compare those numbers with the growth (or lack thereof) in pension assets. Liabilities grew 39 percent while assets only managed 0.4 percent growth over the five-year period. Net pension debt has more than tripled since 2007. An Illinois Supreme Court decision that ruled it was unconstitutional to alter the pension benefit formula has not done them any favors.[29]

Boasting the worst credit rating of any state in the nation (BBB- from S&P, just one level above junk status), Illinois is struggling to service its debts. As of 2017, Illinois' debt service to tax revenue ratio was 10.1 percent, coming in as the second worst in the nation. Illinois' credit rating was downgraded 21 times across the three major NRSROs (Fitch, Moody's, and S&P) from 2009 through 2017. Table 6 displays the current S&P State General Obligation Bond Ratings as of September 1, 2020. Illinois is in a death spiral.

[29] Megan Davies and Karen Pierog, "Illinois' Supreme Court Overturns State's 2013 Pension Reform Law," Reuters, May 8, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-illinois-pensions/illinois-supreme-court-overturns-states-2013-pension-reform-law-idUSKBN0NT1U220150508



Table 5

Summary of Illinois State Public Pension Funding

(annual, FY 2003-2018, billions of current dollars)

FY	Liability	Assets	Net Pension Debt	Funded Ratio	Funding Rank
2003	$83.83	$40.42	$43.40	48.2%	49
2004	$89.83	$54.74	$35.09	60.9%	46
2005	$97.18	$58.58	$38.60	60.3%	47
2006	$103.07	$62.34	$40.73	60.5%	47
2007	$112.91	$70.73	$42.18	62.6%	47
2008	$119.08	$64.70	$54.38	54.3%	50
2009	$126.44	$64.00	$62.44	50.6%	50
2010	$138.79	$63.05	$75.74	45.4%	50
2011	$146.46	$63.55	$82.91	43.4%	50
2012	$158.61	$64.03	$94.58	40.4%	50
2013	$165.46	$64.96	$100.50	39.3%	50
2014	$190.18	$78.63	$111.55	41.3%	49
2015	$199.09	$80.02	$119.07	40.2%	48
2016	$219.35	$78.18	$141.17	35.6%	48
2017	$222.27	$85.39	$136.88	38.4%	48
2018	$230.42	$89.82	$140.59	39.0%	49

Source: Pew Research

Table 6
Current S&P State Credit Ratings
(as of September 1, 2020)

State	Credit Rating	Rank	State	Credit Rating	Rank	State	Credit Rating	Rank
DE	AAA	1	NV	AA+	16	NH	AA	26
FL	AAA	1	NY	AA+	16	NM	AA	26
GA	AAA	1	ND	AA+	16	OK	AA	26
IN	AAA	1	OH	AA+	16	RI	AA	26
IA	AAA	1	OR	AA+	16	WI	AA	26
MD	AAA	1	SC	AA+	16	WY	AA	26
MN	AAA	1	VT	AA+	16	AK	AA-	41
MO	AAA	1	WA	AA+	16	CA	AA-	41
NE	AAA	1	AL	AA	26	KS	AA-	41
NC	AAA	1	AZ	AA	26	LA	AA-	41
SD	AAA	1	AR	AA	26	WV	AA-	41
TN	AAA	1	CO	AA	26	PA	A+	46
TX	AAA	1	ME	AA	26	CT	A	47
UT	AAA	1	MA	AA	26	KY	A	47
VA	AAA	1	MI	AA	26	NJ	A-	49
HI	AA+	16	MS	AA	26			
ID	AA+	16	MT	AA	26	IL	BBB-	50

Source: Bloomberg, CNBC

An Econometric Analysis of the Illinois Fair Tax

As mentioned above, the pending amendment and preemptively passed legislation would create a top marginal personal income tax rate of 7.85 percent, and an absolute income tax rate of 7.99 percent on incomes over $750,000 through a recapture mechanism. That recapture mechanism of the law would create a significant tax cliff and considerable disincentives. The last dollar of a person's income could cost nearly $9,000 in taxes. The amendment would also result in a 10.49 percent combined corporate tax rate. Only New Jersey would have a higher corporate tax rate. Only five states would have higher rates on pass-through income, and only seven states would have higher rates on nonbusiness income.

Although it is certainly possible that there will be additional tax increases over the next decade, the following econometric analysis assumes no additional tax increases during that time. One such example of an additional tax increase would be the decision to tax retirement income, a scenario that would be possible should the amendment in question pass. In fact, every state with a progressive income tax system taxes retirement income, making this likely in Illinois after the

amendment's passage.[30] That fact notwithstanding, we only account for those factors that are currently known in order to speculate as little as possible.

The proposed progressive tax system that would be implemented if the amendment passes amounts to a 3.04 percentage point increase from the current personal income tax rate, and a 0.99 percentage point increase from the current corporate income tax rate. These rate increases will accelerate tremendously the negative domestic migration that Illinois has been experiencing.

As of mid-2019, Illinois' population estimate from the Census Bureau was 12,671,821.[31] The progressive tax system being proposed would, on average, cause 148,000 additional people to leave the state every year, over the next decade. That is above and beyond the existing outmigration trend that Illinois has been experiencing. Illinois lost 1.2 percent of its population over the past decade. The progressive tax amendment would, on average, cause Illinois to lose nearly that same percentage annually in additional outmigration. This analysis, however, makes no claims as to other factors of population growth and decline, such as birth and death rates. As such, this is an estimate of outmigration, not total population decline, which may be smaller or larger. Also, after the first decade, the amount of additional outmigration due to the progressive tax decreases dramatically, in part because more than a million of those most affected by the tax increase will already have left the state.

"The progressive income tax would also significantly slow the growth of home values, largely due to the flood of people fleeing the state."

The higher tax rates are also predicted to slow economic growth in the state. The outmigration and slower economic growth combined will result in approximately 566,000 fewer jobs created over the next decade – a loss of about one in 10 jobs currently in the state. Given the relatively anemic pace of job creation in Illinois[32] compared to the national average, it is possible that this could push the state's employment numbers down to no net job growth in non-farm payrolls over the coming decade.

The progressive income tax would also significantly slow the growth of home values, largely due to the flood of people fleeing the state. This is particularly devastating to all those residents whose homes are not merely dwellings, but also investments that will one day be sold to help fund their retirement. Growth in home values will be approximately 10.4 percent lower at the end of the decade than if the progressive tax were not enacted.

Lastly, just as California's 2012 tax increase did not achieve its revenue projections, neither will Illinois' progressive tax scheme. California's top marginal rate increase of 3 percentage points caused an additional 0.8 percent of high-income households to flee the state, going primarily to states with no income tax. Between the outmigration and the behavioral responses of those who remained, the supposed windfall California was to receive from the tax rate increase turned out to be 45.2 percent less than expected in the first year and 60.9 percent less than expected in the second year.[33] Considering that California "draws about half its in-

30 The flood of retirees out of a state is very damaging to that state's economy. Not only do those individuals take their economic activity with them, but they also take their tax revenue with them as well. Those retirees on public pensions who leave the state in which they had worked are still receiving payments from their former state but no longer providing it with sales, property, income, or excise tax revenue.

31 U.S. Census Bureau, "Quick Facts: Illinois," census.gov, accessed October 2020, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/IL

32 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "All Employees: Total Nonfarm in Illinois [ILNA]," retrieved from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in October 2020.

33 Joshua Rauh and Ryan J. Shyu, "Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from California," *Working Paper*, No. 26349, National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2020.

come tax revenues from roughly 150,000 tax returns,"[33] the loss of just a few of those tax returns causes a noticeable dent in the state's budget. Illinois' switch to a progressive tax with a recapture mechanism would likely harvest only 39 percent of its projected revenue for the same two reasons that California's tax increase failed to achieve its anticipated revenue gains. However, now that there is a cap on SALT deductions, these effects are greatly amplified, resulting in an even larger disparity between the static and dynamic projections. Additionally, Illinois' tax increase, while nearly identical on percentage-point terms, is significantly higher as a percentage of the existing tax rate.

Conclusions and Other Concerns

From a tax and overall economic competitiveness standpoint, the only saving grace in Illinois is the flat personal income tax rate. The state's corporate tax rate is already very uncompetitive, its sales, gasoline, and property taxes are among the highest in the nation, and it is one of only a dozen states that imposes estate taxes. In that regard, adding a progressive income tax, especially one with a recapture mechanism, will be the last straw for anyone considering leaving, and the final nail in the coffin of the state's finances.

Additionally, the proposed progressive tax system does not index the tax rate brackets for inflation, subjecting low- and mid-income earners to bracket creep. This is particularly concerning amid record-setting borrowing at the federal level as sovereign debt explodes, increasing inflationary fears. There is also a heavy marriage penalty and the business tax rates do not achieve their supposed goals of "parity" with personal income tax rates, especially since C-Corps are effectively double taxed. Corporate and pass-through income are likewise unequal.

The current "Fair Tax" proposal would have at least four severely damaging effects. First, it would speed up by almost tenfold the outmigration from Illinois with approximately 1.48 million people migrating to other states over the next decade. Second, it would lower job growth by about 566,000 jobs over that same time. Third, appreciation of home prices would be hamstrung, ending the decade 10.4 percent lower than they would otherwise be. And fourth, the tax system would likely raise less than 40 percent of the revenue its proponents claim will pour into the state's coffers.

Illinois has a clear need for new revenues. But raising tax rates on businesses and individuals is not the correct way to find these revenues. Raising taxes may lead to increased revenues in the short term, but over the long run, Illinois' economy will be severely hindered by these tax changes and these new tax revenues will dry up.

"Raising taxes may lead to increased revenues in the short term, but over the long run, Illinois' economy will be severely hindered by these tax changes and these new tax revenues will dry up."

[34] Victor Davis Hanson, *The Case for Trump* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2019).

Appendix

Coefficients for the effects of top marginal, or top absolute, tax rates are taken from Table 7, derived from regression analysis on a 10-year balanced panel dataset for state tax rates.

The domestic migration effect of the personal income tax rate increase is -1.067040 percent, while the effect of the corporate income tax rate increase in -0.103851 percent, for a combined effect of -1.170891 percent. Given a population of 12,671,821 in Illinois, this yields an annual outmigration effect (rounded down to the nearest thousand) of 148,000.

Domestic migration losses are crucial to predicting job losses since the decrease in population decreases both labor demand and labor supply. (Since many jobseekers will be part of the outmigration trend, this analysis does not predict a significant increase in unemployment, although other analyses have demonstrated states with high and progressive tax structures tend to experience relatively high unemployment.) Higher tax rates on personal income, pass-through income, and corporate income all create either disincentives to work or disincentives to hire, further decreasing labor supply and labor demand, respectively. It is assumed that the current nationwide recession will be short lived, with the economy returning to its long-term growth trend and the trough of the "V" representing permanently lost economic activity. Therefore, employment figures from the end of 2019 were used as a baseline in performing estimations. The arithmetic follows:

6,121,800(0.0304 x -0.11 + 0.0099 x -0.22) + 1,480,000 x -0.36 = -566,605.

While -567,000 is the nearest thousand, -566,000 is a slightly more conservative estimate and this analysis would rather err on the side of caution, no matter how small the difference.

The aforementioned exodus that the progressive tax would cause in domestic migration would decrease housing demand, putting downward pressure on home values and, therefore, slow home value appreciation. Assuming a 2.9 percent average annual home value appreciation, at the end of the decade, a home would be worth 33.1 percent more. Figure 11 shows the relationship between domestic migration and home value appreciation, estimated using data from the last decade.

Table 7

Estimation Results (2) [WLS]

Intercept	0.0796***
	(0.0165)
(δ_1)*Pers Inc*$_{it}$	-0.2013***
	(0.0508)
(δ_2)*Pers Inc*$_{it}$	-0.3510***
	(0.0928)
Corp Inc$_{it}$	-0.1049**
	(0.0440)
(δ_1)*Property*$_{it}$	-2.0848***
	(0.2759)
(δ_2)*Property*$_{it}$	-2.6025***
	(2.1556)
(δ_1)*Sales*$_{it}$	-0.0033***
	(0.0006)
(δ_2)*Sales*$_{it}$	-0.0031***
	(0.0009)
Gas$_{it}$	-0.0002
	(0.0001)
U6$_{it}$	-0.1220***
	(0.0348)
RPP$_{it}$	0.0000
	(0.0002)

***denotes significance at the .1% level

The decline in a state's domestic migration rate correlates with a 0.83 percent reduction in average annual home value appreciation, yielding an average annual growth rate of 2.07 percent and a growth rate of 22.7 percent over the decade, which is 10.4 percent less by the decade's end relative to no progressive tax. Given a conservative estimate of the median Illinois home value of approximately $200,000 under this scenario, the progressive tax represents $20,800 in lost home

value after 10 years. Please note that the 10.4 percent difference is dependent upon an assumed 2.9 percent average annual growth rate. A faster rate in the next 10 years, which is certainly possible given heightened inflationary concerns, would exacerbate the difference, while a housing slowdown with anemic increases in home values would reduce the disparity. Conversely, if home values were depreciating, perhaps during a recession, any further slowdown in housing appreciation (increasing negative magnitude) would also exacerbate the difference in the two outcomes of the progressive tax versus no progressive tax.

Finally, the tax increase is supposedly targeted at the top 3 percent of income earners since its proponents claim that the bottom 97 percent of income earners will receive a tax cut. (Since more than 7 percent of Illinois' households are millionaire households, this seems dubious, especially since millionaire households do not tend to have substantially fewer household members than non-millionaire households, although millionaire households do tend to have more income earners than average.) Regardless of whether or not only 3 percent of Illinoisans will have a higher income tax bill, it is clear that the rate increases are directed at those taxpayers who tend to be both the most mobile and those who are best equipped to engage in behavioral changes to legally reduce their tax burdens. Of the $3.6 billion expected to be raised annually, 36 percent of this additional revenue will likely be lost due to outmigration, while another 15 percent will be lost due to behavioral changes of taxpayers. The recapture provision is particularly harmful here and highly distortionary to static estimates because of the extreme tax cliff that it creates. A married person earning $1 million pays $70,935 in state income tax but earning one dollar more increases the taxes owed to $79,900, an $8,965 increase. This creates a $9,744 range of income wherein the taxpayer has a higher, or equal, after-tax income by earner fewer pre-tax dollars. The $3.6 billion static annual estimate is likely a gross overestimate of actual likely revenue. Instead, a dynamic estimate of 39 percent would be $1.404 billion a year, on average. It is important to note that revised static estimates made after the first five years of the progressive tax would likely be much more accurate since most of the difference between the initial static and dynamic estimates is due primarily to a large initial exodus, similar to the results in California and Connecticut in recent years. The perverse incentives of the recapture mechanism in the tax code would still remain, but since people would have adjusted their earned incomes to accommodate this mechanism, the number of tax returns in this prohibitive range would be substantially lower, again pointing to greatly increased accuracy in a revised static estimate.

Figure 11
Effect of Domestic Migration Rates on Average Annual Home Value Appreciation Rates



About the Authors

Arthur B. Laffer, Ph.D., is the founder and chairman of Laffer Associates, an economic research and consulting firm. Dr. Laffer has distinction in many publications as "The Father of Supply-Side Economics." Dr. Laffer was a member of President Reagan's Economic Policy Advisory Board for both of his two terms (1981-1989) and was a founding member of the Reagan Executive Advisory Committee for the presidential race of 1980. He also advised Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on fiscal policy in the UK during the 1980s. In 2019, Dr. Laffer was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Donald Trump.

Stephen Moore, who formerly wrote on the economy and public policy for *The Wall Street Journal*, is on leave as the Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Project for Economic Growth, at The Heritage Foundation. Moore, who also was a member of *The Journal*'s editorial board, returned to Heritage in January 2014 – about 25 years after his tenure as the leading conservative think tank's Grover M. Hermann Fellow in Budgetary Affairs from 1984 to 1987. Moore, who grew up in New Trier Township, Illinois, received a bachelor of arts degree from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He holds a master's of arts in economics from George Mason University.

Erwin J. Antoni, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at the Committee to Unleash Prosperity and holds master's and doctoral degrees in Economics. His research focuses on monetary policy, labor economics, and tax policy. Antoni has a Ph.D. in economics from Northern Illinois University.

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Contact Information: 3939 North Wilke Road, Arlington Heights, IL 60004, phone 312/377-4000, email think@heartland.org. For more information, visit our website at www.heartland.org.